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Deep-Sea Fisheries:
The Lessons of Experience
Cath Wallace and Barry Weeber
Background
This article draws on a comprehensive research paper
“Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea” which we
presented to the  Deep Sea 2003 Conference in
Queenstown.  In that paper we set out to examine the
New Zealand Fisheries Quota Management System
(QMS) and its issue of property rights to commercial
fishers in the deep-water fisheries within adjustable
catch limits.
In the following pages, we argue that one should focus
on the question; have property rights provided sufficient
incentive to protect the resource and the host
environment?  If not, what adjustments might need to
be made in the mechanisms through which the QMS
was applied?  Of these, the central features have been
the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) and the setting
of catch limits.
The central policy challenge is to understand the
performance of the quota system and to consider it as
an example of a market-based instrument which had
been designed to reset incentives through a property
rights mechanism. The evaluation then leads to
identifying lessons to be learned. For example, we state
below the need to focus on the precise nature of the
“property” which this particular instrument assigns to
the transferee.
Property rights issues have been advanced in the
theoretical literature as a market-based mechanism
through which over-fishing may be controlled in
precisely this manner.  As a lead nation in the experiment
with ITQs, the New Zealand experience is important.
The case history of orange roughy is based on official
figures and has been developed from the Queenstown
presentation. As in other jurisdictions, the decline in
stocks of this species has been very dramatic. In New
Zealand, the failure of the ITQ device has led to some
belated closures of fishing areas to allow recovery to take
place – and arguably more are required. There is a
significant international body of opinion that extensive
marine reserves are needed as an “insurance” against
fishery management failures. That discussion needs to
be had, but we do not cover it here.
The switch to management by
quota
It is now more than 20 years since a quota management
system was introduced in order to control the harvest
from New Zealand’s deep-sea fisheries. This happened
just five years after the declaration in 1978 of an
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around New
Zealand.  This stretches from 12 to 200 nautical miles
(nm) out from the territorial coastline (including
offshore islands). Such a step was sanctioned by the
negotiations leading up to the United Nation’s
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and it
brought about a dramatic expansion of the sea area
and fisheries under this country’s control.
At the time, an ineffective access regime had been in
operation in the inshore fisheries. There was little doubt
that it would have to be replaced by a better system.  In
some fisheries effective open access existed and it was
well known that fisheries exposed to open-access
extraction tend to be harvested at high levels and to
become depleted far below the economic optimum.
Attempts to control fishing effort were based on
restrictions on the types of fishing gear, periods during
which fishing was permitted, and the precise
specification of equipment to be used, such as mesh
size.   Such restrictions, valid for biological protection,
were also used, inefficiently, to control the amount of
fishing effort.  This led to higher costs than necessary,
especially when compared to methods which set limits
to the total harvest from a fishery.
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Internationally, this dual problem of inefficiency and over-
harvesting had become the subject of attention by
economists to see if reliance on harvest limits, coupled
with market-based instruments in the form of property
rights to access the fishery, might provide an incentive
for efficiencies and better biological outcomes. The
quantity limit was seen as allowing fishers to achieve this
by choosing their own methods, while still reducing over-
fishing.  The property right is no more than a right to
access the fishery to take a given quantity or share of the
total allowable catch.  The property rights in New Zealand
waters were expressed within a system of “individual
transferable quotas” (ITQs).  These were seen as providing
fishers with an incentive to protect the value of their asset
- they would enjoy the right to access the fishery (but
not possession of the fish stock itself ).
Ahead of most other jurisdictions, New Zealand placed
its quota management system under an overall constraint
on annual harvest (the “total allowable catch” or TAC)
and proclaimed that this would be capped at a sustainable
level. This TAC would then be shared among commercial,
recreational, customary and science harvesters. Only
commercial fishers were issued with quota, initially as a
set quantity.  Now this is allocated as a proportion of the
commercial share, defined as the Total Allowable
Commercial Catch (TACC). These limits are issued for
each species, or species group, in defined zones known
as “quota management areas” (QMAs). Other fishers,
not within the ITQ system, are governed by other rules.
In the deep-water fisheries, New Zealand introduced
a Quota Management System with a trial in 1983.
The system was formalised and extended to inshore
species in 1986, so we now have considerable
experience with these market-based instruments. The
security of the share of the fishery offered to
commercial fishers by their individual quota was
expected to remove the “race to fish” and to provide
an incentive for fishers to protect the stocks, given
that their quota values depend on sustainable stocks.
This “race” occurs when fishers stuff their vessel with
catching technology and proceed to over-fish, leading
to biological losses and economic inefficiency.
Commercial fish quota owners have the ability to form a
“club” of fishing quota owners. The theory was that such
a collective would then form mutually enforceable rules.
They would decide how much effort to put into self-
policing. In fact, the major burden of compliance and
enforcement has relied on efforts by government agencies
responsible for fisheries control and scientific research.
There are some key lessons to be drawn from New
Zealand’s deep-water fisheries experience. With the
benefit of hindsight, it is now possible to use stock
assessment reports over a twenty-year period and attempt
to answer some of the key policy questions. The record
of the orange roughy fisheries provide a mixed but clearly
discouraging picture, with assessed stocks ranging from
3% to an upper bound estimate of 54% of the original
biomass for different stocks, on 2003 figures (see detail
on pp14-15). Outcomes for other stocks in the
deepwater, such as the oreo species, reveal significant
and risky declines.
Appropriate techniques for environmental management
were given little real attention from the outset.
Protective measures, where they have been introduced
at all, have been slow, piecemeal and reactive, rather
than proactive. Nineteen seamounts were eventually
closed to fishing in 2001, but there has been, over
the 21 year period considered, no formalised and
comprehensive standard environmental assessment
process, and until April 2005 it appeared that any overall
strategy for assessing the impacts of fishing was to be
shelved in favour of single-stock management.
Harvesting theory, valuation, and
property rights as a protective
mechanism
Since the nation’s fisheries represent both market and
non-market values, it follows that the harvesting of
marketable fish species will generate a range of external
costs (which will not be reflected in market prices). By-
catch is a very clear illustration. This results in the
discarding of non-targeted non-quota species and, in
some instances, a reduction in biodiversity (where
fishing impacts on other species and communities).
Similarly, when an operation such as bottom trawling
crushes colonial corals and other benthic habitat, there
will be costs external to any market transaction
(comparable to some extent with the effects of clear
cutting a native forest).
Economists use the concept of “Total Economic Value”
to reflect the fact that the value of fish sold on the market
is only one small part of the value that people attach to
fish. Non-market economic values can include:
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• the values attached to retaining an intact marine
environment (including the stock of fish) for its own
sake (existence value);
• the values of ecosystem functions and the services
that these represent (in this case for instance, habitat,
predator-prey relationships);
• the values of non-extractive uses (such as observation
or scientific enquiry);
• the recreational and aesthetic values we attach to the
marine environment and fisheries;
• the value society places on handing the resource on
to future generations in good shape (bequest value);
• the value put on retaining options for all uses and
benefits in future (option value).
In public policy terms, this particular mix means that
market values cannot be the sole criterion for fisheries
management. Economic efficiency requires that the
sources of benefit in the bullet points above be made
part of the efficiency equation. When all the
instrumental values incorporated in “Total Economic
Value” are considered, it is unlikely that optimisation
of commercial market values will coincide with
economic efficiency.
Core harvesting theory, on the other hand, considers
only harvest values. It suggests that a single owner
wanting to maximise market harvest values for a stock
should optimise the level of fishing effort and fish stocks
remaining by considering:
• the physical productivity of the fish stock;
• the impact on future productivity by current
harvesting;
• changes in costs as a result of harvesting and other
elements;
• future expected revenues, and
• the discount rate (reflecting preference for returns
now rather than in the future and alternative options
for investment).
The setting of catch limits (combined with the allocation
of a property right) was designed to prevent the “race to
fish” syndrome described above.  The TAC may however
be adjusted from year to year so commercial operators
lack one important element of security – exactly how big
is next year’s permitted catch? Faced with uncertainty,
they will have a strong incentive to maximize catch since
any conservation gains are lost to future harvests.
We can see therefore that if the design of the quota
mechanism is determined purely by market values, it is
highly probable that long-lived, slow-growing fish stocks
will be “mined” and the proceeds deployed to higher
yielding investments. This arises because the returns
available elsewhere grow faster than the net capital value
of the slow-growing stock. The higher the discount rate,
or preference for returns now, the more likely it is to
lead to higher levels of fishing and lower fish stocks.
The proceeds from the sale of the fish stock can then be
expected to grow faster than the net capital value of the
fish remaining in the sea. It is for this reason that the
allocation of property rights will not automatically create
sufficient incentives for quota owners to ensure that the
target stock is maintained.
New Zealand’s quota management
system – the practice
At the core of the new system when it was introduced in
1983 (for deep-water fishing, in depths greater than
700m) was the allocation of property rights through the
ITQ.  For a given species or species group, quotas would
be calculated on the basis of total allowable catch in a
given area.  It was expected that the mechanism would
improve efficiency in the industry, while still ensuring
that the harvest was held within “maximum sustainable
yield”. The latter concept is a single-stock biological
harvest concept, not an economic or ecological term, and
requires good science (constantly updated) on the
population dynamics of the species in question.
The reasoning behind the shift to quantity limits, and
away from controls over the type of gear used or the
periods/seasons when fishing would be allowed, was
sound enough. It was expected to induce higher
efficiency in fishing operations overall and to eliminate
the pressures which generate “race to fish” behaviour.
Similarly, it was reasonable to promote (as one element
in the policy) the formation of quota owner associations
in order to improve compliance – the expectation being
that they would apply their own rules to diminish
competitive fishing and cheating.
We have seen, however, that the core incentive to mine
fish stocks as described above was not removed. The
non-harvest values of fish have never been considered by
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the Ministry of Fisheries because of its interpretation of
the term “utilisation” in s.8, which sets out the purpose
of the Fisheries Act 1996. “Utilisation” is defined there
as meaning “conserving, using, enhancing, and developing
fisheries resources to enable people to provide for their
social, economic and cultural wellbeing”. The Ministry,
however, maintains that it actually refers solely to use for
harvesting (Ministry of Fisheries, “Section 8 Policy
Definitions”, p8  c2002). We disagree, on the grounds
that there is nothing in the definition of “utilisation” to
restrict the meaning to extractive uses only, and indeed,
there is much to suggest otherwise.
There was another missing element in the policy design.
It arises from the pervasive incentive to externalise both
the effects on the environment and the costs of lost non-
extractive values. In deepwater fisheries, there are
numerous slow-growing species with no market value (this
is true both of fish and of the colonial animals that provide
important habitat structures). There has to be a very rapid
change in harvest levels for any market mechanism to
recognize an incentive to protect the environment.
Set out overleaf is the population history of orange roughy,
using the officially accepted figures, where catch declined
very steeply in almost every area of the fishery following
the imposition of the quota system in deepwater fisheries
in 1983. Similar trends have been recorded for most of
the other deep-water species which come under the quota
management scheme and for the “mid-water” hoki fishery,
originally a huge stock that has suffered marked decline.
The New Zealand experience in this respect is of
international interest, given the claims that were originally
made, and continue to be advanced, for the success of
the quota management system.
Institutional and process failure?
Reviewing the twenty-year period of ITQ operation in
New Zealand, one is struck by the institutional evolution
and the “work-in-progress” character of the mechanism.
Public policy was administered under intense industry
pressure and on the basis of unduly optimistic
assumptions about incentives, stocks and outcomes.
The precautionary approach to resource management
is not often in evidence. There is an assumption of
greater importance of commercial interests over any
other, both by industry and by many (but not all)
officials and Ministers, partly due to the industry’s ability
to mount legal challenges.  There has been a reluctance
(especially by the industry) to have adequate resources
put into independent scientific environmental appraisal.
We consider that a dismissive attitude on the part of
many officials towards the environmental and future-
regarding provisions in the Fisheries Act (1996) was
evidenced by their dubbing these “the religious bits”, a
term used frequently at meetings.
Industry players and administering officials in almost
all other environmental and resource management
sectors have to face regular public input into
management plans, policies and the like, frequently
under statutory process.  Fisheries management in New
Zealand has, by contrast, lacked regular public process
and engagement has been limited to “approved parties”1.
Fisheries Management Plans were abolished in the mid
1990s. The perception of officials at the time was that
they were cumbersome.  Barebones legislative authority
for new forms of fisheries plans was introduced by the
Fisheries Amendment Act 1999. The Ministry produced
3 initial papers on these plans in March 2001.
Subsequent work, including consultation, has resulted
in their elaboration. Significantly, the Ministry of
Fisheries has proposed that harvesters hold the pen and
that other interests be asked to make submissions to
them. The Minister would then approve or decline the
resulting fishery plans but would not be allowed to
change them. This proposal is apparently based on the
argument that industry compliance will depend on their
agreement with the plan. This subjugation of non-
harvesters, non-quota owners, and the Minister of
Conservation to plans defined by quota owners has been
the source of great contention.
A forward agenda
Any attempt to improve future decision-making in this
sector, while retaining quantity limits, with ITQs as the
key tool for management of the resource, would have
to tackle the following agenda:
• Where does environmental science feed into the
process?
Stock assessment will always be an inexact science,
but ecosystem assessment is even harder. Stock
1 “Approved Parties” are the nationally organized representatives of
commercial, recreational and customary fishers, environmental
interests and occasionally others, who apply to an gain approval
annually from the Minister to be consulted under s.12 of the Fisheries
Act 1996.
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The story of the orange roughy fishery is instructive, since it
has been the dominant deep-water species over 20+ years
of management under ITQs, both in terms of volume and in
terms of price and value. Annual catches of 40-50,000 tonnes
were recorded during the 1980s, peaking in 1989/90.  Since
then there have been significant catch reductions leading to
progressive (but lagged) reductions in catch limits for
individual fisheries. The consequence of this has been a drop
in the quantity allocated under ITQs, since these are
expressed as a percentage of the total allowable catch. In
the deepwater, there is no recreational or customary catch,
so these reductions are not due to non-commercial fishing.
For all fish stocks “– with the controversial exception of by-
catch stocks – there is a legal requirement for the Minister
to ensure that fish stocks are maintained “at or above” the
level that will produce the maximum sustainable yield
(Fisheries Act 1996, s13).  For orange roughy, this minimum
stock size has been set at 30% of the original unfished
biomass. At that level, it is estimated that the stock will
provide a “maximum sustainable yield” in terms of biological
replacement for the extracted harvest.
The overall decline in orange roughy stocks is brought out
more starkly when the stock assessments are traced for
each of the quota management areas for this species –
see graphs opposite for the period 1983 to 2003. These
are the officially accepted stock assessments, and they
demonstrate a pattern of separate and significant declines.
In two-thirds of the cases, stocks have fallen well below the
30% mark, some to as low as 3% and 7%: (yet in 2005 the
fishing industry wants to reopen one of these, without any
indication that the stock has recovered).
Fishing was allowed to continue for many years as the stocks
declined further, though the Ministry of Fisheries claims that
these are on a path to recovery. Despite these claims, with
the exception of the Chatham Rise fisheries, there is little
evidence of stock rebuilding.  Environmental organisations
have lacked resources to take legal action against what they
saw as disregard for the requirements of s.13 of the Act.
The Ministers in office during the period have mostly erred
on the side of generosity to the fishing industry, usually
pitching catch limits above those recommended by scientists
and environmentalists, often at or above the level suggested
by the fisheries management officials – bringing most of
their decisions close to what the industry wanted. Catch
limits have been reduced but usually by a significant lag
behind the stock assessments.
The Challenger and Puysegur fisheries were only closed when
they reached 3% and 7% of the original biomass respectively.
Environmental organisations attempted to get science done
on the impacts of bottom trawling. In the late 1990s and early
2000s, research was commissioned from NIWA on this aspect.
Results to date show significant damage done by trawling.
When Pete Hodgson took the reins as Minister in 1999, he
reversed years of inaction and agreed to the closure of 19
seamounts in 2001, some already fished, some too deep
to fish, and some potentially fishable.
The overall picture which emerges from the orange roughy
experience leads on to a series of questions, not only
concerning the ITQ as an appropriate device for sustainable
management in deepwater fisheries, but also about the
decision-making processes, the inputs into those processes
and the institutional framework within which they occur.
Decline and Closure in the  
assessment is an important component, but only one
part of the necessary science. When stock and
environmental estimates have a wide margin of error,
then catch limits and catch method controls must
be precautionary.
• Who commissions and does the science, and who
owns the data?
There is a clear danger in implying that the industry
has an untrammelled  property right over the deep-
water resource – other than a permit in perpetuity
to harvest a share of the allowable commercial catch
subject to environmental protection and other social
goals for the fishery. The Fisheries Act makes it clear
that sustainability must be ensured and that future
generations’ needs must be provided for (s.8).  Industry
entitlements are subject to obligations and to wider
social goals.  Industry ownership (or control) over the
commissioning, contracting, or performing elements
of the scientific process was enabled in the Fisheries
Amendment Act 1999 over the objections of
environmental and scientific bodies. Industry pressure
on scientists has at times been explicit. It is insidious in
its effect and therefore cuts across availability and access
to science as a public good.
SUMMARY OF TOTAL CATCH
Year Recorded catch (tonnes)
1982/83 48,207
1986/87 52,332
1991/92 37,013
1996/97 16,645
2001/02 14,381
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 Orange Roughy Fisheries
• Is there sufficient evidence to rule out the “hard-
landing” (heavy stock depletion) option in future
decisions on total allowable catch?
The fishing industry has preferred to take higher
immediate catches and accept “hard landings”,
meaning that future allocations will be much
reduced.  The very rapid stock reduction illustrated
in the orange roughy case suggests this choice was
driven by discount rate factors and that it is
unsustainable for deep-water fisheries.  When the
eventual catch cuts occurred, Ministers were
nevertheless given the blame!
• Why is there no environment assessment process
nearly ten years after the passage of the Fisheries Act,
which is quite specific on the requirement to avoid,
remedy or mitigate any adverse effects of fishing on
the aquatic environment (s.8), on the mandatory
consideration of environmental principles (s.9) and
the precautionary approach required (s.10)?
In the deep-sea environment there are unique
requirements for any effective process of
environmental assessment. The most obvious is the
large input of resource for accurate monitoring of
environmental damage and for stock assessment.
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FIG 1 ORANGE ROUGHY STOCK DECLINES.  THE DOTTED LINE REPRESENTS 30% OF THE
UNFISHED BIOMASS, THE VOLUME CALCULATED TO PROVIDE THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD.
THIS IS THE LEGAL MINIMUM FOR TARGET FISH STOCKS, WHICH THE FISHERIES ACT 1996 (s.13)
Note: letters on the graphs refer to the type of stock assessment: c = catch per unit effort, a = acoustic survey, t = trawl survey, e = egg survey
Source: Malcolm Clark, National Institute of Water and Atmosphere (NIWA), New Zealand.
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Preparation for a Strategy for Managing the
Environmental Effects of Fishing eventually began
in 2001 but has languished. It may now, with a new
Chief Executive at the helm, be revived.
A rapid response requirement is vital; that is, the TAC
must be automatically reduced when signs of depletion
are registered. “Second opinions” can follow, but the
precautionary principle should always apply.
• How should the resources be generated for adequate
management of ITQs or any other allocative
mechanism?
The cost recovery system suffers the flaw of
providing a potent mechanism for industry capture
of fisheries management and research. Resource
rentals have been eschewed since they were
abandoned by a government under challenge from
Maori as to whether the government did indeed
own the resource and hence have legitimacy in
imposing a resource rental.
The Auditor-General in 1999 found that low priority
was given in the budget process to funding for
information and environmental science and
management. The evidence in the original paper
points to a familiar combination of spineless political
management and bureaucratic surrender.  The
industry comes out repeatedly as the clear winner.
• How are non-market values to be reflected in
fisheries management and how can the public be
involved in the process of fisheries management?
Both the Resource Management Act and the
Conservation Act provide examples of the way in
which such values can be articulated in law.  They
also include specific mechanisms for engaging the
public in conservation policy and resource
management planning.  An essential element is that
all parties have equal and effective access to input
and influence.
Research findings
In the Queenstown paper we also isolated three key
questions:
a) Does theory suggest a property rights regime alone
can be relied on to protect fish stocks and the
environment of the deep sea?
b) Has the New Zealand Quota Management System
been a success in terms of management of fish stocks
and the deep-sea environment?
c) What wider lessons for deep-sea resource
management can we learn?
Our responses were negative on both a) and b); this opinion
was based on dynamic economic harvesting theory and
the evidence of the fish stocks and lack of environmental
controls. As stated above, when a species is slow-growing
high discount rates will provide a dominant incentive to
extract the resource (and find a commercially better
placement for the proceeds elsewhere).
Similarly, incentives to avoid damage to the environment
are not provided by the Quota Management System or
ITQs; instead, such effects continue to be externalised.
The ecosystem values of non-target species will
effectively be disregarded.  Perhaps the central confusion
stems from the fact that commercial interests have been
able to interpret ITQs as a grant of untrammeled
property rights (and sometimes to threaten litigation
on these grounds). This has reinforced the industry’s
instinct to resist any public benefit through more
effective environmental controls.
We conclude therefore that the New Zealand experience
brings out the way in which a property rights mechanism
can lead various stakeholders to lose sight of societal
and other interests. This comes about because those non-
commercial rights are not codified in the quota system.
The basic error is to leave industry with the illusion of
unattenuated “ownership”. Almost inevitably, the role
of the public sector (as the principal agent for the
interests of society and the environment) is then eclipsed.
Once this happens, the administrative principles behind
a quota management system and enforcement of catch
limits will, like the target fishery itself, collapse.
In future (and this was our answer to the third question),
it will be crucial to configure any institutional framework
so that industry pressure is not dominant.  Groups that
want to see higher fish stocks retained for non-extractive
and ecosystem purposes should have an effective voice,
and the resources to use it. Some jurisdictions use an
independent board to set catch limits and controls - but
accountability mechanisms then have to be put in place.
In the New Zealand context an independent board could
perform that role, with Ministers required to report to
Parliament on any proposed variation.
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A design for the future
Any resolution of these issues will need to recognize that
we are not in a static policy scenario, either in the national
or international context.  Resource depletion in the oceans
is leading on to new initiatives.  Most recently, in New
Zealand, the whole process of developing an “Oceans
Policy” was initiated – and later stalled. Ecosystem-based
management in the high seas is under active discussion
at the United Nations and elsewhere, as are controls on
high seas fishing, particularly bottom trawling.
In all these situations, our public authorities need to
assert the powers vested in them by statute and to
provide for ecosystem-based management of fishing and
other activities. They will need to levy resource rentals
and recover management costs, and these decisions must
be decoupled from undue industry influence. Only in
this way can research on, and management of, New
Zealand fisheries display the same integrity as that
operating in other areas of the public estate.
Re-jigging incentives to reduce environmental damage
is crucial. Public authorities must require that fishers,
like their terrestrial counterparts, take steps to avoid,
remedy or mitigate adverse effects of fishing. Such a
rearrangement of the quota management system might
of course be seen as some sort of economic sacrifice, or
as “capitulation to the greenies”. This has been a typical
reaction in many similar situations, but it loses sight of
the bigger picture and of the specific legal obligations
that New Zealand has accepted under the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Moreover, economic
efficiency would be enhanced by reform.
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(which is where the whole EEZ entitlement started)
each nation state carries an absolute obligation “to
preserve and protect the marine environment” (Art.
192) and to ensure that the management of marine
resources meets other criteria endorsed by the
international community. New Zealand has already
come under intense criticism from the international
community (at the 2004 United Nations Informal
Consultation on Oceans and the Law of the Sea) for
the impacts of our bottom trawlers on the high sea.
This attention is set to intensify.
It follows that a revamp of fisheries management would
in essence represent the responsible exercise of the
obligations accepted by New Zealand in this sector.
Without such reform, it is clear that we shall not live
up to our own concerns for sustainable development,
and for the equitable distribution of benefits to New
Zealand citizens, including future generations.
Cath Wallace is Senior Lecturer in the
School of Government at VUW (as
mentioned on p.2), with an
international reputation for her policy
work over many years on oceans,
fisheries and Antarctic ecosystems, and
for her contribution as a Council
Member of the World Conservation
Union (IUCN). Barry Weeber is
Senior Researcher at Forest and Bird
(Central Office) in Wellington and in
2003 he collaborated with Cath on the
paper referred to in the opening
paragraph, entitled “Between the
Devil and the Deep Blue Sea”.
The exhaustive bibliography assembled for the authors’
2003 paper will be posted on the IPS website, and
readers wishing to make e-mail contact with the authors
can use:
Cath.Wallace@vuw.ac.nz
b.weeber@forestandbird.org.nz
The key reference for the statistical material used in this
article is;
Annala, J.H., et al., (2003) “Report from the fishery
assessment plenary, May 2003: stock assessments and yield
estimates” Ministry of Fisheries.  (Unpublished report
held in NIWA Library, Wellington)
